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In this thesis, I examine the behavior of inflation and unemployment in the United States,
the United Kingdom and Norway, and test to what extent we can explain inflation and
unemployment dynamics using models that allow real wage growth to diverge from labor
productivity growth.
Chapter 1 presents the characteristics of the “New Economy” period. A simple
Phillips curve model is included for illustrative purposes. Possible explanations for the
macroeconomic behavior of the U.S. are pointed out, and some historical data on labor
productivity growth rates is presented.
In Chapter 2, the price-wage spiral, an important part of price-wage dynamics, is
presented and explained.
In Chapter 3, the core model of this thesis – the productivity-augmented Phillips
curve – is derived. Wage aspirations are explained and incorporated into the wage setting
process. The neoclassical factor rewardance results are demonstrated, and placed in
connection with the productivity-augmented Phillips curve, ultimately relating these
results to inflation. A section on the natural rate of unemployment is included, and
the connection between the NAIRU and the productivity-augmented Phillips curve is
discussed. I also look at the effects of productivity growth on the Phillips relationship,
and further, how productivity might affect the price-wage spiral. Finally, the more general
Phillips relation of the ’Triangle’ model is discussed.
Chapter 4 is the main investigative part of my thesis. I estimate several Phillips curve
type models using Ordinary Least Squares regression, examining the relevance of the
productivity-augmented Phillips curve. Data for the U.S., U.K. and Norway is analyzed.
Evidence is found suggesting that the gap between labor productivity growth and wage
aspirations growth (which affects actual wage growth) has a negative and statistically
significant effect on the change in inflation rates over time. The explanatory power of this
gap is found to be stronger for the U.S. and the U.K. than for Norway. I also compare
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1 The U.S. 1996-2000: A New Economy?
The term “New Economy” refers to the development of certain macroeconomic variables
in the U.S. during the second half of the 1990s. Unexpected1 behavior in especially three
variables led journalists, politicians and economists to believe that the U.S. economy
had gone through a structural shift; those three variables were the inflation rate, the
unemployment rate and the rate of productivity growth.
Authors such as Alan Blinder referred to the perfomance of the U.S. economy as “gen-
erally superior” (Blinder, 2000). The title of J. Bradford DeLong’s “What Went Right
in the 1990s? Sources of American and Prospects for World Economic Growth” paper
demonstrates a similar view – the U.S. economy had improved its performance. Addi-
tional potential explanations for this “New Economy” are discussed in Ball and Mankiw
(2002), such as greater openness to international trade and improved job market match-
ing and the acceleration of productivity growth. As for the acceleration of productivity
growth, they state that this aspect was a central feature of the New Economy. Popular
media wrote about a “trauma theory” (as presented by Alan Greenspan), where ’trauma-
tized workers’, in fear of losing their jobs, did not push for higher wages.2 Certainly, such
a phenomenon can be related to greater openness of trade and the advent of large-scale
outsourcing of jobs. Whatever the reasons for the sense of job insecurity among workers
(there may be several), the point is that wage demands were not growing much. Given
the high labor productivity growth of this period, the story goes, this essentially led
to wage growth lagging productivity growth. These developments did not go un-linked
with another central feature of the “New Economy” – low inflation rates. For, if profits
were rising and wages not, wouldn’t that put downward pressure on pricing decisions
throughout the economy?
The story is as follows: the unemployment rate which was thought to give non-
1As opposed to what we would expect when examining an economy with a well-behaved NAIRU
environment.
2For instance, The New York Times printed an article called “Job Insecurity of Workers Is a Big
Factor in Fed Policy” in 1997.
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accelerating inflation (the NAIRU) was estimated to be somewhere in the neighborhood
of 6 percent for the United States (see Ball and Mankiw, 2002). What happened after
1995, was that the unemployment rate fell far below this level without a significant change
in the inflation rate. In fact, inflation remained low (compared to historical inflation
rates since fiat money was introduced) throughout the whole period referred to as “The
New Economy”. This clearly signifies a break with what the standard Phillips curve
relationship predicts; movements in either inflation or the unemployment rate should give
a movement in the opposite direction for the other variable (i.e. should unemployment
be pushed below what is considered normal for the economy, one would expect a rise in
the inflation rate).3 Over 1996-2000 both these variables reached low levels and remained
relatively low throughout the period. This fact is the apparent paradox of “The New
Economy”.4
Table 1: Average U.S. inflation (pi) and unemployment rates (U)
Period Average inflation Average unemployment
1981 - 1985 5,5% 8,3%
1986 - 1990 4% 6%
1991 - 1995 3% 6,6%
1996 - 2000 2,5% 4,6%
2001 - 2005 2,6% 5,4%
Unemployment and inflation data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (http://www.bls.gov)
3See Stiglitz (1997): page 5.
4Paradox because it breaks with standard theory. Blinder (2000) refers to the unexpectedly high
productivity growth rate over this period. However, this is not a paradox, as we have no established
theory of what rates of productivity growth can or should be expected. The standard theory of NAIRU
is well-established and has a solid theoretical foundation (see Ball and Mankiw, 2002); that for a given
inflation rate, lower unemployment will lead to higher bargaining power on behalf of workers and thus
higher wage growth. This will, for given profits, induce firms to increase their prices, so a higher rate of
inflation results.
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The period of the “New Economy” – circa 1996-2000, was a period with impressive
macroeconomic performance. It has the lowest average inflation rate (2,5%) and the
lowest rate of unemployment (4,6%) of these five-year periods. What is perhaps most
striking, is that average unemployment for the period as a whole is approximately 2
percentage points below the consensus NAIRU estimate – while the average inflation
rate of this period is lower than in the period preceding it (which had an unemployment
rate average of 6,4 %). Thus, unemployment fell far below the NAIRU estimate without
triggering an accelerating inflation rate – average inflation was actually lower during the
“New Economy” period (as compared to previous periods). To explain this, either the
NAIRU must have somehow rapidly decreased (through the arrival of a truly new econ-
omy), or this period must have been one with very beneficial supply shocks. The latter
is given support in the somewhat agnostic conclusion of Blinder (2000), where all being
admitted is that productivity growth was high for a longer period than earlier thought
possible. Thus, no views of changed fundamentals are invoked; it is simply stated that
the total growth in labor productivity over the period 1996-2000 was higher than ex-
pected or thought likely.
The standard formulation of the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation can
be represented by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve of the type:
Π = Πe − a(U − U∗) (1)
where Π is inflation and Πe is expected inflation. U∗ is the NAIRU, and U is the actual
unemployment rate. Thus, the constant a measures the effect on inflation when unem-
ployment deviates from the natural rate of unemployment (by natural we also understand
NAIRU - the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment).5 For instance, if U is
below the natural rate, (U − U∗) is negative. This negative number is then multiplied
by a (which has a negative sign), such that Π must increase. This is the standard result
5The two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
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– as unemployment drops below the natural rate, inflation will start increasing.6 If we
assume Πe = Πt−1, solve for the inflation difference (∆Π = Πt − Πt−1, i.e. the change
from one period to the next), and add a supply shock v, the Phillips curve becomes
∆Π = −a(U − U∗) + v (2)
According to Ball and Mankiw (2002), the distinction between U∗ and v can be considered
somewhat arbitrary – this because they both shift the inflation-unemployment tradeoff.
That is, they are not necessarily distinguishable when it comes to their effect on inflation
and unemployment. However, for the sake of thorough and precise analysis, it would
be wise to give this some additional thought; whereas the NAIRU is usually assumed
to be determined by the fundamental structure of the economy, such as labor market
functioning, tax structure and demographics – variables that typically cannot be changed
rapidly or too often, supply shocks are often of a more short-lived and erratic character. If
this is correct, one would perhaps expect significant, structural changes in the economic
environment to have a permanent effect on the NAIRU, while supply shocks can be
expected to have more short-lived effects. The question of whether supply shocks really
shift the NAIRU should also be raised – after all, a shock and the effect it has - is
expected to disappear. In Ball and Moffitt (2001) supply shocks are considered changes
in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff for a given NAIRU.
Combinations of inflation and unemployment previously thought incompatible emerged
and persisted during the era of the “New Economy”. Clearly, this challenged orthodox
opinion. What is important to notice, is that a supply shock may trigger episodes like
the one that took place in the latter part of the 90’s in the U.S.: inspecting (2), we
observe that even if unemployment is below the natural rate U∗ for a while, giving rise
to higher inflation ceteris paribus, a supply shock that has the effect of giving lower
inflation ceteris paribus, can ensure that Π actually decreases even while U < U∗. Of
6For a discussion of the term natural rate of unemployment, see Ball and Moffitt (2002) and Stiglitz
(1997).
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course, when the supply shocks eventually disappears, one would expect inflation to start
increasing rapidly. The bottom line is: if the economy is hit by strong and persistent
supply shocks, it might (for a while) seem like important structures of the economy are
subject to new rules or no rules at all. Obviously, when examining the period of the
“New Economy”, one should take both the possibility of fundamental, structural change
and that of persistent supply shocks seriously.
The second aspect of “The New Economy” that seems widely agreed upon, is the
high growth rate of productivity – more precisely, labor productivity growth. The boost
in productivity growth rates was often linked to new, evolving and more frequently used
technologies such as computers and the Internet. DeLong (2000) makes the point that
rapidly decreasing prices of components used in information technology settings, such
as semiconductors (used in CPUs) and computers, may have contributed to accelerating
use of information technology equipment. If such technologies are subject to increasing
returns to scale, this may have had a positive effect on the productivity of many workers,
and possibly a substantial effect on the economy as a whole.
Table 2: Average U.S. labor productivity growth rates (θ)
Period Labor productivity growth rates
1976 - 1980 0,96%
1981 - 1985 1,66%
1986 - 1990 1,26%
1992 - 1995 1,14%
1996 - 2000 2,16%
2001 - 2005 2,36%
Source: OECD Stat.Extracts
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDYGTH)
From table (2) we see that the “New Economy” period is a period with a high aver-
age labor productivity growth. The average growth rate for the 20 years preceding this
period was 1,25%. Thus, average yearly productivity growth during our New Economy
5
period was nearly twice that of the period 1976-2005. Also, one should note that the
macroeconomic performance of the 5-year period after “The New Economy” was very
strong. Average yearly inflation was only slightly above that of our new economy, and
unemployment somewhat higher – though it did not reach the NAIRU estimate of ap-
proximately 6,2% (the peak unemployment rate for this period was at 6,0% in 2003).
Labor productivity increased more during 2001-2005 than 1996-2000.
The development of inflation, unemployment and productivity growth in the U.S.
from 1996 to 2001 was remarkable. Surely, commentators’ decision to nickname this
period can be understood. While unemployment is usually linked to inflation via NAIRU
theory and Phillips curve relations (assumed to hold at least in the short run), no such
link is usually posed between inflation/unemployment and productivity. The standard
Phillips does not include productivity growth, as it relies on the neoclassical foundation
that productivity growth directly feeds into the wages of workers. What one should be
aware of, is that if the relationship between productivity growth and wage growth is
somehow disturbed, this can alter the Phillips relation – i.e. the link between inflation
and unemployment. This should be kept explicitly in mind when investigating periods
like “The New Economy”.
2 The Price-Wage Spiral
The workings behind the idea of a ’price-wage spiral’ is conveniently summed up by
Blanchard (2003): “Think about what happens when firms respond to an increase in
demand by increasing production:
• Higher production leads to higher employment.
• Higher employment leads to lower unemployment.
• Lower unemployment leads to higher wages.
• Higher wages leads to increased production costs, leading firms to increase prices.
• Higher prices lead workers to ask for higher wages.
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• And so on.”
Whether we start from an increase in the demand for goods, or an increase in the
real wages of workers does not really matter (we would then be looking at a wage-
price spiral, but the underlying mechanisms at work would be the same), as argued by
Blanchard (1986). If we let increased real wages be the start of the process (that is, if we
let nominal wages increase for a given level of price inflation), the spiral effects follow;
and so, independent of which part of the economy the motion comes from, the spiral of
changes in wages and prices follow. What this spiral of change represents are the actions
taken by the two bargaining parts (workers/unions on one hand, firms on the other) in
order to maintain and increase their “share of the pie”. Whereas workers or the unions
that represent workers want as high real wages as possible, and as low unemployment as
possible, firms want to maximize their profits. The pie is given by the value of the sales
of the firm, i.e. it’s total income.
Through wage bargaining workers/unions and firms decide how much of the pie is
allocated to workers (through money wages), and how much is allocated to firms (through
profits). The price-wage spiral shows how price changes spread throughout the economy;
an increase in the price of a good does not simply occur, leaving the system at rest. The
price change induces workers to try to maintain their previous level of real income by
asking for a higher money wage. If the demands of workers are met, surely this will affect
the profit of firms, and so they might want to raise their prices in response to the higher
real wages to maintain some level of profits. We see that there is an interdependent
dynamic to this process, where the two actors (workers and firms) each respond in turn
to the actions taken by the other part. This interdependent dynamic is the price-wage
spiral.
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3 The Productivity-Augmented Phillips Curve
In Ball and Moffitt (2001) a special version of the Phillips curve is presented, where
productivity growth plays a potential role in shifting the Phillips curve7 This is done by
combining a wage-setting relation and a price-setting relation in which the aspirations
for wage growth affect actual wage setting. The wage setters (which in this model are
the workers themselves) are assumed to have a target for real wage growth that depends
negatively on the unemployment rate (U), positively on growth in labor productivity
(θ) and “wage aspirations” (A). The negative relationship between U and target wage
growth is the standard one in Phillips curve models, where high unemployment weakens
the bargaining power of workers, so that they typically will obtain lower wage increases
under high unemployment compared to situations with low unemployment.
3.1 Wage aspirations
Aspirations for wage development A are formed according to:
At = β ·At−1 + (1− β) · (ωt−1 − pit−1) (3)
Aspirations are determined by previous wage increases (represented by ω), given an initial
A (the aspiration in the period where the economy is assumed to start). The size of β
determines how fast aspirations are updated after changes in real wage growth. We see
that as β → 1, aspirations for wage increase in the present period (t) will only depend
on the aspirations of the previous period (t-1). Thus, β gives us the speed of aspiration
adjustment when actual real wage growth changes. If β = 1, aspirations will remain
stationary, and aspirations will be the same forever. As β → 0, a marginal weight is put
7The phrase ’productivity-augmented Phillips curve’ was used in Gruber (2003). In so-called “main
course” theories of wage determination, productivity (along with foreign prices) are elements of a ’wage
corridor’ - a corridor that sets the upper and lower limits for wage growth. In the productivity-augmented
Phillips curve, however, we examine a closed economy, so no foreign prices are included. While the foreign
price element does not relate the Phillips curve and main-course models, the productivity element does
– acting, in both models, as a determinant of the rate of wage growth that can be sustained in the long
run.
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on aspirations from previous periods, and workers will aspire for appoximately the same
real wage increase in the current period as in the previous.
Two crucial assumptions regarding wage aspirations are made in Ball and Moffit
(2001). The first one is that aspirations affect actual wage setting (i.e. aspirations are
not just ideas without influence on economic decision-making. The link is made explicit
by allowing workers to behave as wage setters). The second assumption is that aspirations
are to some degree linked to the wage increases experienced in the past.
Keeping the “traumatized worker” in mind, one should give these aspirations some
additional thought. Clearly, the approach taken by Ball and Moffitt (2001) is a rather
simple one. A fundamental critique of such an approach to aspirations would be: if
aspirations are thought to reflect some sense of “fair wages”, what happens to aspirations
if the cost of fair wages is too high? If ’too high’ wage increases leads to the loss of jobs
(or, workers think ’too high’ wage increases will lead to the loss of jobs), will they push
for the wages they perceive as fair? If not, wage growth aspirations depend on more than
past aspirations and past real wage growth.
3.2 Aspirations and the price of labor
In this section, I will demonstrate how aspirations for wages may affect the link between
productivity and (real) wages. These wage aspirations have an impact on the actual real
wage development. The crux of the Ball and Moffitt (2001) model is allowing for imperfect
updating of wage aspirations, and it is this imperfect updating that allows wage growth
to deviate from the growth of labor productivity. The idea of aspirations builds on habit
formation in wage expectations, where workers can “get acquainted” with a certain rate
of wage increases. If there is a positive shift in the growth of labor productivity, workers
could - everything else given - get a higher real wage without reducing the profit of the
firms. However, considering habit formation allows wages to fall out of line with labor
productivity growth because workers are accustomed to a certain rate of wage growth.
Wage development can therefore deviate from the development of productivity. This is
a break with neoclassical analysis.
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The neoclassical relationship between wages and productivity can be analyzed within
a framework where a representative firm uses labor input in the process of producing
the amount of output that maximizes profits. In the case with two inputs, capital and
labor, the firm has to choose the combination of inputs that yield the highest amount of
produce which it can sell at the prevailing prices (which the firm will take as a given).
The problem of the firm is:
max
{Kt,Lt}
Πt = p · f(Kt, Lt)− rt ·Kt − wt · Lt (4)
Equation (4) represents the profit maximization problem of the firm, with K and L as
the control variables of the firm. It takes the price p as exogenously given, and chooses
the use of the two input factors, capital (K) and labor (L), where the prices of these
inputs are r, which is the rental price of capital, and w, which is the wage rate paid to
workers.
The solution to the problem is found by taking the first-order derivatives of the choice
variables K and L, and setting them equal to zero:
∂Πt
∂Kt
= p · (f ′L)t − rt = 0 (5)
∂Πt
∂Lt
= p · (f ′L)t − wt = 0 (6)
(f ′K)t is the marginal product of capital at time t – that is, how much production increases
when the capital stock is marginally increased given the production already obtained at
time t. Similarly, (f ′L)t measures how much total production increases when a worker
puts in an additional (marginal) effort (this might be an hour of overtime for an already
employed worker, or the hiring of one extra worker, depending on how we define it.)
We see that wages are always set according to their contribution to production. So, if a
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worker works an hour extra, he earns the value of what he produces during that hour.
Thus, the neoclassical framework yields the result that wages always increases at the
same rate as labor productivity. We will never see labor productivity growth deviate
from real wage growth in this type of framework, and since this holds for all points in
time, the real wage will always equal a worker’s value contribution to production, that
is, the price of the output he produces multiplied by the amount of output he produces.
The link between factor productivity and factor payment obtained in the neoclassical
framework rests on the assumption markets are perfectly competitive. This means that
we implicitly assume that there are no unions disturbing labor supply and/or affecting
wage setting, and that firms do not pay so-called efficiency wages. There is no need for
effort-enhancing wages of this type, as workers, who are paid their full marginal product,
have no incentive to be lax while working.
The model presented and estimated by Ball and Moffitt (2001) does not make any
assumptions with regard to market structure. However, in their analysis lies an implicit
assumption regarding wages, namely that wages need not follow labor productivity one-
to-one in the short run. This is clearly at odds with the neoclassical result that fL = w
at all points in time.
3.3 Wage and price inflation
The equation for target real wage growth in given by
(ωt − piet )target = α− γ · Ut + δ · θt + (1− δ) ·At + εt (7)
where εt is the error term. piet is the inflation expected to take place from t-1 to t. A
is the wage increase that workers aspire to achieve. From (7) we see that the weight
attached to productivity growth in wage growth aspirations is δ, and the weight attached
to aspirations is (1 − δ). The size of δ determines to what extend aspirations actually
have an effect on the growth of real wages. If we let δ = 0, (7) reduces to (ωt−piet )target =
α−γ ·Ut+At+εt, so that aspirations have an affect on the determination of wages, while
productivity growth has no effect. The other extreme is where δ equals unity - so that the
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aspiration A is multiplied by zero and disappears from the wage setting relation, leaving
us with the relation (ωt − piet )target = α − γ · Ut + θt + εt This is the solution obtained
under neoclassical assumptions, where aspirations are not a part of wage setting and
productivity increases affect wages instantaneously.
The model allows both habit in wage increase expectations as well as actual pro-
ductivity growth to affect wage setting. In this respect, it deviates from the standard
neoclassical prediction, where the price of labor (i.e. wages) equals the marginal product
of labor at all points in time. If aspirations for instance is lower than productivity growth
for some time, wages will fall out of line with the marginal product of labor. While the
Ball-Moffitt model allows these kind of deviations from neoclassical theory to take place
and persist through the short run, they will be corrected for in the long run, where wages,
aspirations and productivity all grow at the same rate.
The nominal wage growth for period t (ωt) is set in period t-1, making wage setters
guess inflation in period t for obtaining their target level of real wage growth. A certain
way of expectations formation is assumed on behalf of wage setters: what is commonly
referred to as adaptive or static expectations. Under such an assumption, agents use
the inflation rate of one period to forecast the inflation of the next period (piet+1 = pit,
or pit = pit−1). Wage setters set the nominal wage increase increase to be equal the
target real wage growth plus expected inflation: ωt = (ω − pi)targett + piet . Solving for
ωt − piet = (ω − pi)targett , setting piet = pit−1, and solving for ω, we get:
ωt = α+ pit−1 − γ · Ut + δ · θ + (1− δ) ·At + ε (8)
Equation (8) is a “wage Phillips curve” which links nominal wage inflation to the price
inflation of last period (believed by wage setters to prevail into the current period), the
unemployment rate U and a weighted sum of productivity growth θ and aspirations A.
The next step is determining the inflation process. Here, inflation is produced by firms
when their costs increase (i.e. unit labor costs increase faster than labor productivity),
plus an error term. Specifically, the “cost increase” is the wage growth rate less the
12
productivity growth rate from a period to the next. So, if wage growth lies above the
productivity growth, the firms face a cost increase, and this will lead firms to raise
their prices in perfect relation to this cost increase. Thus, any cost increase that firms
experience (and are not compensated through by productivity growth) will lead to a price
increase of the exact same order. Inflation is thus given by:
pit = ωt − θt + νt (9)
where νt is the error term. To obtain the productivity-augmented Phillips Curve (PAPC),
which is the one to be estimated, equation (8) is combined with equation (9) to get the
price Phillips curve, which determines the rate the general price level in the economy
will increase at. As our wage Phillips curve takes both productivity growth and wage
growth aspirations into account (and these factors affect price inflation), we get a richer
model of inflation determination. For instance, it can allow inflation to remain low while
the employment rate is high; if productivity increases faster than real wages, unit labor
costs drop. It then becomes relatively cheaper to hire labor, and so unemployment might
drop if firms decide to act on this incentive to use more labor input in their production
processes. This is crucial to our analysis of the “New Economy”.
To obtain the price Phillips curve, which is the empirical Phillips curve Ball and
Moffitt estimate and compare to a standard Phillips curve, we insert for ω from (8) in
(9) and get: pit = ωt − θt + νt = α − γ · U + δ · θ + (1− δ) · A− θ + ν + ε. Rearranging
leads us to our price Phillips curve:
pit = α+ pit−1 − γ · Ut + (1− δ)(θ −At) + t, t = εt + νt (10)
One should note that the price Phillips curve can be written on an error correction form.
Simply move the pit−1 term left of the equality sign and notice that pit − pit−1 = ∆pi.
This interpretation of the equation states that the year-to-year change in the inflation
rate is a function of the unemployment rate and the relative sizes of θ and A. Again,
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the unemployment rate U , which is multiplied by the (positive) parameter γ, has a
negative impact on the change in inflation rate. If ∆pi equals some positive number, and
unemployment increases, price inflation will be lower in the next period. This is because
as unemployment increases, workers claim more modest wage increases. We know from
the price inflation relation (9) that since wage inflation will be lower, price inflation will
also be lower (for a given θ). So, as unemployment increases in period t, the change in
price inflation from period t to t+1 will be lower than from period t-1 to t, all else being
equal.
3.4 The NAIRU
If one wishes to invoke the idea of a non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment –
that is, the unemployment rate which gives an inflation rate that is constant (i.e. it does
not accelerate or decelerate over time), the following can prove illustrating: let labor
productivity grow in line with aspirations such that θ = A. In the long run there are
no shocks (or, rather, the negative shocks and positive shocks cancel each other, so 
equals 0). The NAIRU unemployment gives non-accelerating inflation, that is, ∆pi = 0.
The price Phillips given by (10) curve now becomes: 0 = α − γ · U . We solve for the
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment and get: γ · U = α ⇐⇒ UNAIRU = αγ .
Thus, the NAIRU in the PAPC is defined as the U that gives ∆pi = 0 and θ − A = 0.
Movements in (θ−A) are considered to be supply shocks, as they affect the cost of labor.
Any movement in either θ or A (given that they do not move in opposite directions but
with the same magnitude) will affect the unit labor cost. Since these costs are the main
component of price decisions made in firms, it seems fair to treat them as supply shocks.
Such movements are thought to alter the unemployment/inflation tradeoff implicit in the
Phillips curve for a given NAIRU, not alter the NAIRU itself. Even though not explicitly
mentioned in Ball and Moffitt (2001), the NAIRU is thought to be determined by more
fundamental structures than the short-run divergence of θ and A. Since it is assumed
that these variables grow at the same rate in equilibrium, such that (θ−A) = 0, they do
not affect the NAIRU. Rather, they can temporarily change the (pi, U) menu for a given
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NAIRU. In the long run, however, we return to the same natural rate of unemployment.
This, however, is not a logical implication that is reached regardless of how one views
the NAIRU concept. Rather, with the given formulation of aspirations, real wage growth
always catches up with productivity growth as we approach the long run, and thus,
equilibrium unemployment will be the same as before any growth divergence between θ
and A occured.
The story of the model is therefore: if the growth of θ and the growth of A fall
out of line for some time, this can give rise to unexpected combinations of inflation and
unemployment. Though these combinations of (pi, U) may be experienced in the short to
medium run, they will not prevail in the long run. As workers update their aspirations
after recent increases in real wage growth, they will eventually aspire to have real wages
grow in line with marginal labor productivity – aspirations grow at the same rate as
productivity. As price inflation becomes stationary (because when (θ −A) is zero, firms
do not systematically change prices) , so does wage growth, and the unemployment rate
that prevails is the NAIRU. One should also keep in mind that the speed towards long-
run equilibrium (or stationarity) depends on how fast aspirations are adjusted, i.e. the
size of the parameter β.
The difference between (10) and an ordinary Phillips curve is the inclusion of the
(θ − A) term. This term represents a potential break with the neoclassical assumption
that factors of production at all times are rewarded according to their marginal contri-
bution – if the term differs from zero, wages will not move in tandem with productivity
(as suggested by the neoclassical framework). They will be equal in the long run, as as-
pirations update towards actual productivity growth and employment rates change, but
this might take a long while. If we start from a situation of θ = A, as these are growth
rates, a deviation implies an acceleration or deceleration of one or both. Thus, inflation
will be stationary even though both aspirations and productivity grow (as long as they
grow at equal speed). There will be upward pressure on inflation when aspirations for
wage growth grow faster than productivity, and downward pressure when productivity
grows faster than aspirations. Thus, starting from a steady state, an acceleration or a
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deceleration in (at least) one of these growth rates is needed for the inflation rate to
change.
Apart from the unemployment rate, this model allows productivity growth changes
to affect inflation. If we look at the equation for price inflation, and rewrite it in terms
of wage inflation, we see that wage growth is given by productivity less price growth
(ignoring the error term). Since we will generally assume that β < 1, updating of wages
will not be immediate as productivity growth changes. Aspirations, as specified by (3),
cannot change unless productivity growth does. The sequence of events is that first
productivity growth changes, leading to changed wage growth. This wage growth then
feeds into the wage growth aspirations of workers. So, the main idea behind this extended
Phillips curve is to let productivity growth changes affect the profitability of firms and
thereby their decisions with respect to the use of labor input. Persistence of the effects of
productivity growth changes are ensured by a sluggish adjustment of wage aspirations,
such that the profitability of firms and potentially the unemployment rate will be affected
for some time if θ 6= A. The existence of slowly adjusting aspirations allow changes in
the rate of labor productivity to affect inflation through changes in unit labor cost.
3.5 Productivity growth
Phillips curve models – whether they allow productivity growth to have effects on inflation
and unemployment or not – do not seek to explain productivity growth. In a given period,
the productivity growth that will prevail during a certain interval t, θt, is not explained
by the model. The productivity growth simply arrives. No assumptions regarding the
development of productivity growth are made. We allow productivity growth to vary
substantially from year to year and decade to decade.
In the real world, one might be able to explain some of these trends in productiv-
ity growth by tracing them back to actual historical events that are likely to affect the
productivity of workers. One example of such an effort was made in “What Went Right
in the 1990s? Sources of American and Prospects for World Economic Growth” (De-
Long (2000)), where the point is made that rapidly evolving information technology, and
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especially the use of computers, may have contributed to the observed boost in labor
productivity growth in the second half of the 90s in the United States. Such historical
investigations are, though interesting and important enough, not the focus of this thesis.
Rather than asking “why productivity growth?”, I ask what the effects of changes in
labor productivity growth is on central macroeconomic variables. Especially is the effect
on the tradeoff between inflation and unemployent emphasized.
3.6 Productivity growth and the ’Price-Wage Spiral’
A central question is if the inclusion of the productivity growth and aspirations growth
gap (θ −A) in any way affects the price-wage spiral. In answering this, one should start
with an analysis of why these spirals occur. This was covered in section (2). The lesson
was that for a given surplus (i.e. a given level of profits for the firm), any changes in wages
or prices affect what firms and workers get in real terms. As the two parties negotiate on
how to share the surplus, they push wages or prices in their favored direction when given
the opportunity. For instance, workers (wanting higher real wages), push up the nominal
wage in period t− 1. Firms lose profits unless they raise their prices, so in period t they
adjust their prices upward, and inflation increases. This is the spiral.
We then turn to the question of what might weaken/strengthen this spiral, or even
prevent it from taking place. In the productivity-augmented Phillips curve framework,
the new elements are productivity growth and aspirations of wage growth. Aspirations
are not the prime mover of anything; aspirations move over time only as the result of
other changes in our present framework (nothing happens to A unless real wage growth
changes, which requires a change in inflation or nominal wage growth). Thus, one should
look at productivity growth. Assume we are initially in steady state, and then aggregate
demand increases at time t+1, such that ADt+1 > ADt. Allowing for an additional
change in the economic environment we let labor productivity increase more rapidly (a
positive shift in the growth rate), such that θt+1 > θt.
With higher labor productivity for given wages, firms will increase their profits. With
higher profits, firms can either raise real wages or hire more workers - or a combination
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of the two. If the surplus generated by the boost in productivity growth is large enough,
the following scenario might take place; the first year, when (θ −A) is at its largest, the
firm will hire quite a few new workers. Some aspiration updating in the next period will
lead to real wage increases, but they are not yet as high as the increases in productivity.
Additional hiring takes place, and there might be room for some more real wage growth.
If the initital differences between θ and A are large enough, such that the economic
surplus generated by the productivity growth acceleration is of some size, we might get a
scenario where both real wages and unemployment increase without spurring accelerating
inflation. Why? Because firms have no need to pass on the costs of increased real wages,
as they make more profits.
We see that if the productivity growth acceleration is large enough, and aspirations
for wage growth fall short of this growth, the increased surplus of the firm makes it able
to hire many workers (leading to a low unemployment rate) at the same time as workers
get real wage increased. So, allowing (θ − A) > 0 gives room for higher employment
and increased wage growth without firms having to resort to price increases. A possible
outcome of our initial scenario (ADt ↑, θt ↑) is a weakening of the price-wage spiral, and
potentially a full prevention of its occurence.
3.7 The ’Triangle’ Model of Inflation
An additional perspective on the inflation process is presented in the so-called ’Triangle’
model of inflation (see Gordon, 1997). There, Gordon points to a revision of the basic
Phillips curve consisting of two steps; one being the introduction of a zero long-run
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, the other: including supply shocks.8 This
resulted in a Phillips curve with three variables explaining the inflation process; inertia,
supply shocks, and aggregate demand.
Intertial inflation is the part of the inflation that is inherent in the economic system,
regardless of the status of aggregate demand and supply. It is thought to be slow-moving,
such that in steady state (with no excess demand and no supply shocks) inflation will
8See page 302 of the Brookings Institute Paper No. 2 (1998).
18
change little from year to year. This being a fairly stable process, expected inflation in
period t+ 1 would be close to that of period t.
It should be clear that supply shocks may have an impact on the rate at which the
general price level increases. If, for instance, the price of oil started to increase rapidly,
this could potentially affect pricing decisions throughout the economy. As firms using
oil or oil related inputs experience soaring costs of these inputs (and seek compensation
through charging higher prices for their final products), workers on their hand will ask for
wage increases as a compensation for their weakened purchasing power – the ’price-wage
spiral’ immediately comes to mind. The link between supply shocks and inflation seems
obvious.
The third variable contributing to the determination of inflation is aggregate demand,
or, rather, the level of aggregate demand relative to potential output. We are in a
situation with ’excess’ demand if aggregate demand is higher than potential output –
however, it is not obvious how to actually represent excess demand. Different proxies
can be used – for instance, one could employ the difference between the natural rate of
unemployment and actual unemployment.9 As unemployment moves below the natural
unemployment rate (or NAIRU), aggregate demand will start increasing. This will result
in increasing inflation, and is a very fundamental result in Phillips curve type models.
The triangle thus consists of intertial inflation, supply shocks and a measure of excess
demand.10
The zero long-run tradeoff is now a fairly standard assumption in macroeconomics.
This tradeoff emerges due to the fact that unemployment gravitates towards the natural
rate of unemployment in the long run. As this process cannot be put out of play, an
attempt to keep unemployment below the NAIRU in the long run (through expansionary
monetary policy) will only result in price increases (and, these price will be occuring at
9This rests on the assumption of a link between unemployment and demand. Such a link is provided
in Blanchard (2003): page 129 .
10One could of course have excess demand with a negative sign in front. This corresponds to aggregate
demand lagging potential output, and is a situation where unemployment is above the natural rate. The
inflation rate will then be decreasing.
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a faster rate the longer we have U > UNAIRU ). Hence, there is no long-run tradeoff. (In
the short to medium run, however, monetary policy can push unemployment away from
UNAIRU , but then at the cost of accelerating inflation. As we reach the long run, only
the cost remains.)
In Gordon (1997), inertial inflation is represented by the lagged value of inflation.
Using just one lag of inflation to represent inertia, the ’Triangle’ model of inflation can
be written as
pit = a · pit−1 + b ·Dt + c · st + εt, (11)
where Dt measures excess demand (D equal to zero means that aggregate demand equals
potential output). st is our supply shock (st means no supply shocks that affect the rate
of inflation take place during time interval t), and εt is the error term. Though this is a
very simple representation of a triangle model, it demonstrates the main point; inflation
history, demand conditions and supply shocks are the main determinants of inflation.
We notice that this formulation of the Phillips relationship explicitly takes cost-push and
demand-pull factors into consideration (through st and Dt, respectively). Gordon (1997)
states that “the role of the lagged inflation terms is to capture the dynamics of inertia,
whether related to expectations formation, contracts, delivery lags or anything else.”
That is, if we let inertia be captured by inflationary expectations, and we assume those
expectations to be static or backward-looking (as Gordon indeed does), a link between
the ’Triangle’ model and the standard expectations-augmented Phillips curve presents
itself.
If one makes the assumption that Ball and Moffitt (2001) do, and let workers operate
under static expectations, the two models (Ball-Moffit and ’Triangle’) coincide with re-
spect to interial inflation – inflation today is dependent on inflation in the previous year
(in the exact same manner), though a more general representation of the ’Triangle’ might
include more than one lag of inflation (i.e. pit−2, pit−3 and so on). The price Phillips curve
derived by Ball and Moffitt (equation (10)) includes the gap of productivity growth and
real wage growth aspirations (θ−A). As noted, this gap is essentially a supply shock, so
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the models have in common that they allow supply shocks to affect the rate of inflation.
Unemployment is, however, treated differently in the two models. While the unemploy-
ment rate itself is a variable in the price Phillips curve of Ball and Moffitt, the Triangle
model uses the gap between actual and natural unemployment (as a proxy for excess
demand).
Both models (Ball-Moffitt and Triangle) allow for inflation inertia (for instance due to
expectations). As for the treatment of the supply, the productivity-augmented Phillips
curve only includes one specific supply shock (the gap between labor productivity growth
and wage growth aspirations), while the Triangle model has a more general supply shock
variable. This should come as no wonder, as the productivity-augmented Phillips curve
was created to investigate to what extent inflation behavior in “The New Economy” could
be explained by including this special type of supply shock (productivity growth) and
slowly moving wage aspirations. Even though unemployment is treated somewhat differ-
ently in these Phillips curve equations, the mechanisms at work are basically the same;
the higher the level of employment, the larger the chance of the economy experiencing
inflationary pressures (ceteris paribus).
The Ball-Moffitt model should thus be considered a special case of the Triangle model
of inflation (which in turn can be considered an extended Phillips curve relation), designed
to allow divergence of wage and productivity growth rates, and to empirically investigate
the effect of such divergence on inflation.
4 Estimation
4.1 Data and measurement
All data used in this chapter are collected from the OECD Statistics webpage.11 Un-
employment is the unemployment rate for all persons as reported by OECD. Inflation is
measured as the percentage change in the CPI (consumer price index), all items included.
Nominal wage growth refers to the growth rate of labour compensation in the business
11Contact m.solem.johansen@gmail.com if you are interested in the datasets used in this thesis.
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sector excluding agriculture.
However, not all variables needed for the estimation of a productivity-augmented
Phillips curve are observable. In Ball and Moffitt (2001), two of the variables used for
estimating the productivity-augmented Phillips curve are constructed; these variables are
the growth rate of labor productivity and aspirations for real wage growth.
My approach to modelling aspirations follows that of Ball and Moffitt, while that of
labor productivity growth does not. Ball and Moffitt measure productivity growth as the
change in the log of output per hour in the business sector (excluding agriculture) after
taking cyclical effort movement into account. The reason for taking effort into account is
as follows: when demand starts increasing (at the start of an economic expansion), firms
will not start hiring new workers immediately. Rather, one would expect that in the first
phase of the business cycle, workers will simply increase their effort in order to meet the
increased demand. If the upswing persists, businesses will start hiring more workers. This
means that one should take this effort effect into account when measuring productivity
growth; for, if this effect exists and is of a significant size, measured productivity growth
with be biased positively. Some of the increase in production will be due to movement
in effort rather than due to higher actual productivty. In order to cope with this, Ball
and Moffitt (2001) regress measured productivity growth on the change in the logarithm
of hours worked. They find, however, that adjusting for cyclical adjustment explains
only a small fraction of productivity growth. For the reason of simplicity, I abstain
from performing a cyclical adjustment to labor productivity growth, and use the series
as reported by the OECD. My reason for doing so is that, despite this lack of cyclical
adjustment, these data capture the broad patterns (as discussed in Ball and Moffitt,
2001: pages 11-12) of productivity growth rates over time (see table (2)). It is reported
in Ball and Moffitt (2001) that their empirical results are not very sensitive to the use of
productivity growth series (adjusted versus non-adjusted).12
The inclusion of wage growth aspirations is one of the key elements in our new Phillips
curve; these aspirations affect real wages, and real wage growth affects the profits of firms
12See Ball and Moffitt, 2001: page 12, footnote 3.
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over time. We believe that pricing decisions to some extent rely on profits (as discussed
in section (3.6)), where I explain how the price-wage spiral can be weakened by firms
making higher profits. We thus have a potential link between aspirations and inflation.
Wage growth aspirations are given by At = β ·At−1 + (1− β) · (ωt−1 − pit−1). While real
wage growth (ω − pi) can be observed and measured, β and A cannot be observed. In
choosing β, the parameter which determines the speed of adjustment of aspirations to
developments in real wage growth, I follow the main approach by Ball and Moffitt, and
set β equal to 0.95.13 Low values of β seem unrealistic, as this generates ’much’ change
in aspirations when real wage growth changes. If wage growth is relatively high one
year, a high β would imply that workers ’get accustomed’ to this high wage growth, and
expect this for the future. If the period following this were to be one with low real wage
growth, workers would suddenly aspire for low wage growth. As aspirations are meant to
capture some sense of ’fair wage increases’, a less rapidly moving β seems realistic. What
is perceived as fair does not change radically from year to year. On the other hand, a
’too’ large β implies that workers do not really consider the evolution of real wages in the
near past, but rather, base their aspirations on wage increases in the distant past. If this
was true, workers would not be adapting their wage growth aspirations, and “workers
still want the wage increases they received in the 1950s” (see Ball and Moffitt (2001):
page 15).
Also, in order to derive this aspirations variable, one needs a suitable initial A. I
follow Ball and Moffitt, and let aspirations in the initial period be equal to the trend
real wage growth in that period, as calculated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.14 In the
case of the United Kingdom my data starts in 1972, so this is the initial period in this
economy. The HP-filtered trend growth in real wages for 1972 is equal to 3.3 percent.
Assuming that aspirations and the actual trend in real wages were not too different in
this period, aspirations for real wage growth were 3.3 percent in the U.K. in 1972. Thus,
13This value for β is also used in Gruber (2003).
14This filter decomposes a time series into a trend component and a cyclical component. I follow Ball
and Moffitt (2001) in setting the ’punishment’ parameter λ equal to 1000. The HP-filter performs a
minimization problem of the form: min
∑T
t=1
(yt − τt)2 + λ
∑T−1
t=2
[(τt+1 − τt)− (τt − τt−1)]2.
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A1972 = A0 = 3.3. Next, we need to determine aspirations for 1973. This is done by
inserting the values for A1972, β and actual real wage growth in 1972. Using A1972 = 3.3,
β = 0.95 and (ω − pi)1972 = 5.99, we get A1973 = 0.95 · 3.3 + (1− 0.95) · 5.99 = 3.44. We
get the result that in 1973, workers in the U.K. aspired to have a 3.44 percent real wage
increase. The procedure is repeated for all periods in my dataset, giving us values for
the aspirations variable for the period 1973-2008.
Once we have found the wage aspirations variables, we can construct the gap between
labor productivity growth and real wage growth aspirations. This is the central modi-
fication of the empirical Phillips relation; it allows us to see if the inclusion of this gap
variable increases the ability of the model to explain changes in inflation. As discussed
in sections (3.1) through (3.6), this gap – which affects the profitability of firms – if
large and persistent enough, can contribute to keeping inflation low despite low levels of
unemployment (be it the unemployment rate or the level relative to some natural rate).
4.2 Empirical investigation
Along the lines of Ball and Moffitt (2001), I ask whether the inclusion of the productivity
growth less wage growth aspirations gap (θ − A) – PA gap from now on – can improve
the performance of the Phillips curve, and, if so, to what extent. The estimation strategy
adopted is the standard one of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We make the following
assumptions regarding the error term εt:
(A1) E(εt) = 0
(A2) Cov(Ut,εt) = 0
(A3) Cov(εt, εt+j |Ut, Ut+j) = 0 for j 6= 0
(A4) Var(εt|Ut) = σ2
where E is the expectations operator. (A1) states that the error term on average should
equal zero. Cov is the covariance between the unemployment rate U and the error term
ε, so (A2) means zero covariance between our explanatory variable and the error term.
(A3) holds that the error terms should be independent. (A4) is a requirement of constant
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variance of the error term.
Assuming these assumptions to be met, we can estimate the standard Phillips curve
using OLS. The standard (expectations-augmented) Phillips curve estimated is
∆pit = β0 + β1 · Ut + εt, (12)
This equation investigates to what extent the unemployment rate can explain the change
in the inflation rate from period to period. β0 is the intercept term. From theory, as
discussed thoroughly throughout this thesis, we expect the unemployment rate to affect
the rate of change in inflation. This effect is in turn expected to be negative – that
is, when running regressions, we expect β1 to be negative. The productivity-augmented
Phillips curve to be estimated is the same as (12) with the addition of the PA gap (θ−A):
∆pit = β0 + β1 · Ut + β2 · (θ −A) + εt, (13)
where we expect the coefficient on the PA gap, β2, to be negative (as discussed). A
few regressions will also be performed on a non-expectations-augmented Phillips curve,
where the inflation rate (and not the rate of change in the inflation rate) is the left-hand
side variable. Including the PA gap, we estimate
pit = β0 + β1 · Ut + β2 · (θ −A) + εt, (14)
or, without the PA gap:
pit = β0 + β1 · Ut + εt (15)
4.3 Testing the assumptions
If assumptions (A1) through (A4) hold, we can estimate equations (12), (13), (14) and
(15) to obtain coefficient estimates that are unbiased and consistent.15 I therefore conduct
15Unbiased means that the expected value of the estimator equals the true value of the estimator
(E(βˆ1) = β1 and E(βˆ2) = β2, and so on). Consistent means that the probability limits of our estimators
approach their true values as the sample size tends to infinity.
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three tests to see if my data is characterized by these properties. First, I test if the
residuals found in my regressions are approximately normally distributed (i.e. test for
normality). If they are, (A1) holds and we can use standard tests (e.g. F-tests and t-
tests). Then, I investigate if the error terms have heteroskedastic properties. If they do,
the variance of the error term will not be constant, and assumption (A4) breaks down.
Lastly, I will look into the issue of autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is found (and found
to be statistically significant), assumption (A3) breaks down, the error terms no longer
being independent.
Table 3: Assumption test results
Country EE χ2normality Fheteroskedasticity Fautocorrelation
US (13) 0.15692 [0.9245] 2.2351 [0.0897] 5.3182 [0.0101]
UScorr (16) 2.4537 [0.2932] 0.54329 [0.8108] 2.9764 [0.0673]
UK (13) 5.81185 [0.0545] 1.0431 [0.4027] 0.78186 [0.4664]
Norway (13) 3.1324 [0.2088] 1.2203 [0.3245] 1.8044 [0.1814]
EE is the model specification used for testing the assumptions.
In table (3) test results for normality, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are given.
In the case of the U.S., the chi square value clearly indicates normality (i.e. the hypothesis
that our data is characterized by normality cannot be rejected at the 5% level). The null
hypothesis of homoskedastic error terms cannot be rejected, so (A4) holds. However, the
F-value for autocorrelation (5.3182) exceeds the critical level at the 5% level, indicating
autocorrelation. This calls for corrective measure before running regressions on U.S.
data.
The U.K.: none of the null hypotheses are rejected at the 5% level, indicating that
are assumption of normality, absence of autocorrelation and absence of heteroskedasticity
are valid. We thus proceed with OLS.
Also in the case of Norway will OLS also give consistent and unbiased estimators,
as none of the null hypotheses are rejected. Normality, absence of autocorrelation and
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heteroskedasticity seem to be characteristics of Norwegian data as well.
4.3.1 Dealing with autocorrelation
When autocorrelation is present – as it is in U.S. data – the estimators found are no longer
the best linear unbiased estimators. In addition, inference is no longer valid, forcing us
to take some kind of corrective measure.
I follow Ball and Moffitt (2001) in dealing with autocorrelation by including two lags
of the inflation change variable in my regression.16 The new equation is
∆pit = β0 + β1 ·∆pit−1 + β2 ·∆pit−2 + β3 · Ut + β4 · (θ −A) + εt, (16)
We estimate equation (16), and run normality, heteroskedastity and autocorrelation tests
on the results. The results are summarized under UScorr (where corr means that it has
been corrected for autocorrelation) in table (3). We see that extending the US Phillips
curve with two lags of the change in inflation reduces the value of the autocorrelation
coefficient to 2.98, which means we cannot, at a 5% significance level, reject the hypothesis
that there is no autocorrelation (the critical value being 3.34). Normality still holds, and
the data does not display heteroskedasticity. Thus, equation (16) can be used to obtain
the best linear unbiased estimators for the U.S.
4.4 Results
I estimate equations (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16) using data from 1972-2008 (Norway
and the U.S.) and 1973-2008 for the United Kingdom.
The expectations-augmented Phillips curve (non-productivity-augmented) performs
fairly well on U.S. data from 1974-1995 (the “Old Economy”). The model is capable
of explaining half of all variation in the inflation rate (see table (1)). Unemployment is
significant and negative, as we expected, showing that during this period, more unem-
ployment lead to a marked deceleration of inflation. As we extend the analysis to include
16See Ball and Moffitt (2001): page 24.
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the New Economy period (1996-2000), the explanatory power of the model is weakened
if we leave the two lags on ∆pi out of the regression. R2 drops from 0.52 to 0.35.17
This is the New Economy showing up in our results. However, including two lags of
the inflation change gives the model increased explanatory power when we examine the
New Economy period, as R2 is 0.55 for this specification of the model. Estimating the
productivity-augmented curve for the period 1972-2000 using an initial A of 0.49 increases
the explanatory power of the model – R2 increases from 0.55 to 0.69 when including the
PA gap. The PA gap has the expected sign and is significant at the 5% level. Using a per-
haps more realistic18 initial A, I obtain an R2 of 0.74. Including the years through 2008
in our regression, we find that the explanatory power of the non-productivity-augmented
(but still expectations-augmented) Phillips curve is at it’s weakest, with an R2 of 0.51
(equal to that of US1). As we try to explain the change in inflation rate over the whole
period with the PA gap included, we get an R2 of 0.66, which is lower than the R2 of
model US4. In all periods and specifications examined, the coefficient on the PA gap
stays negative and of a magnitude of about -0.70, and it is statistically significant at the
5% level. My values for R2 are very close to those found in Ball and Moffitt (2001) for
the producitivity-augmented Phillips curve. The intercept term and coefficient on the
unemployment estimates are fairly stable (at about 3 to 4 for β0 and -0.5 to -0.6 for β3)
and similar to those found in Ball and Moffitt (2001). Comparing models US2 to US4
and US5 to US6 we see that R2 increases when the PA gap included, demonstrating the
relevance of the PA gap. The predictive power gained by including this term seems to
vary across time. This is in line with our intuition; as the gap is not constant, it matters
more during some periods than others (and, it seems that it mattered quite a lot during
17Compare US7 and US8.
18Realistic because aspirations for a real-wage growth of about 0.5 percent seem quite low – especially
if compared to Ball and Moffitts estimate of 4.2%. Ball and Moffitt advise us not to calculate aspirations
based on periods of where aspirations and real wage growth diverge. They explicitly mention the period
of the 70s as an example of this. I meet this criticism by computing an average value for the aspiration
variable, which is the average of my estimate (which is probably biased downwards because of the above-
mentioned reason) and the initial aspirations variable (A) found by Ball and Moffitt. This average (AAVG0 )
is then used when running regressions on U.S. data.
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1974-2000).
Table 4: Phillips curve estimates for the U.S.
Model EE Period PA Gap β0 β3 β4 A0 R2
US1 (12) 1974-1995 No 3.03 (1.091) -0.50 (0.172) 0.51
US2 (12) 1974-2000 No 3.74 (1.381) -0.59 (0.208) 0.56
US3 (16) 1974-2000 Yes 4.05 (1.172) -0.53 (0.177) -0.73 (0.228) 0.49 0.69
US4 (16) 1974-2000 Yes 4.16 (1.085) -0.65 (0.163) -0.75 (0.190) AVG 0.74
US5 (12) 1974-2008 No 3.03 (1.091) -0.50 (0.172) 0.52
US6 (16) 1974-2008 Yes 3.62 (0.935) -0.57 (0.146) -0.64 (0.174) AVG 0.66
US7 (12) 1974-1995 No 8.85 (1.952) -1.30 (0.278) 0.52
US8 (12) 1974-2000 No 5.24 (1.497) -0.82 (0.225) 0.35
A0 is the initial aspiration value.
US1-US6 are performed using specifications correcting for autocorrelation, i.e. they include lags
of the change in inflation. However, I choose not to include the coefficients on these variables in
this table (that is, I exclude β1 and β2), as they are not essential parts of my analysis, but rather
variables included for the purpose of eliminating autocorrelation. For estimated coefficients on the
lagged changes in inflation, see table (7) in the appendix.
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.





= 2.345 = AAVG0 .
US8 is estimated without lagged inflation change variables, and shows the weak explanatory power
of the standard model when we include the New Economy period. US7 is the standard model
without lags excluding the New Economy period.
EE is the equation estimated in the respective models.
Regression results for the United Kingdom 1973-2008 are given in table (5). UK1
estimates (12). The amount of variation in ∆pi that can be explained is found to be
0.14. The coefficient on the unemployment rate is -0.59, leaving us with the ’correct’
sign, but the effect is not all that strong, and not statistically significant at the 5% level
(though by a very small margin). Extending the regression to include what was the New
U.S. Economy (1996-2000), we perform the same regression. The results are very similar,
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indicating that no New Economy took place in the U.K. from 1996-2000. Making use
of the Phillips curve with the PA gap, we obtain the following results: for the years
1973-2000, R2 increases from 0.13 to 0.58. The PA gap has an estimated coefficient
of -1.56 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The expectations-augmented
Phillips curve performs equally well if we include the years 2001-2008, suggesting that
deviations of wage growth aspirations from labor productivity growth played a strong role
in determining the evolution of inflation over this whole period. The non-productivity-
augmented Phillips curve performs poorly compared to the one with a PA gap. For the
U.K., the PA gap is potent as an explanatory factor of inflation changes over this period,
whereas the unemployment rate is not.
Table 5: Phillips curve estimates for the U.K.
Model EE Period PA Gap β0 β1 β2 A0 R
2
UK1 (12) 1973-1995 No 4.66 (2.672) -0.59 (0.312) 0.14
UK2 (12) 1973-2000 No 3.98 (2.234) -0.53 (0.270) 0.13
UK3 (13) 1973-2000 Yes 1.17 (1.669) -0.30 (0.190) -1.56 (0.301) 3.3 0.58
UK4 (12) 1973-2008 No 3.27 (1.625) -0.46 (0.210) 0.12
UK5 (13) 1973-2008 Yes 0.84 (1.230) -0.26 (0.150) -1.52 (0.260) 3.3 0.56
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Models with with PA gap included are productivity-augmented Phillips curves.
A0 = 3.3 is the authors’ calculation.
EE is the equation estimated in the respective models.
Table (6) shows the results for Norway 1972-2008. Models N1-N3 and N7-N8 use ∆pi
as the dependent variable, while N4-N6 and N9-N10 use pi as the dependent variable.
The reason for running regressions on the non-expectations-augmented Phillips curve is
that few of the right-hand side variables are statistically significant at the 5% level in the
expecations-augmented specifications of the model – with the exception of β1 and β2 in
model specification N8. The general results from these regressions are: the unemployment
rate seems to be able to explain quite a lot of the variation in the inflation rate, with the
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coefficient on U negative and often well below minus 1 (implying a strong effect of U on
pi) and always significant for models N4-N6 and N9-10. The R2 fluctuates from 0.49 to
0.62 (for N4). N7-N9 give negative values for the coefficient on the PA gap, but they are
not always significant. Comparing (N5) to (N9), we see that the inclusion of the PA gap
increases R2, while R2 decreases when adding it for the whole period (compare N4 to
N10). In N10 the PA gap even has the opposite sign of what is expected, but the effect
is never significant. We note that generally, Norwegian data do not match very well with
the expectations-augmented Phillips curve (which must be considered the standard one
in the literature).
The productivity-augmented Phillips curve succeeds to a fair extent in accounting
for variation in inflation rates. In the U.S. (as confirmed by Ball and Moffitt, 2001) and
the U.K., the PA gap improves the explanatory power of the models estimated here. It’s
effects are generally significant and of some size (especially in the U.K. does the gap
improve the performance of the model). Whether adding this gap to Norwegian Phillips
curves is more unclear; in one specification it slightly improves the explained variation in
pi (see results for N5 and N9), in another a slight decrease in explained variation follows
(see N4 and N10). The productivity-augmentation thus seems like a potent explanatory
variable. However, for the case of Norway, this variable does not seem as relevant (it is
only statistically significant at the 5% level in model (N8), and there the effect is weaker
than than typically found for the U.S. and the U.K.). We also note the absence of a
typical expectations-augmented Phillips relationship for Norway.
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Table 6: Phillips curve estimates for Norway
Model EE Period PA Gap β0 β1 β2 A0 R
2
N1 (12) 1972-1995 No 0.96 (1.034) -0.36 (0.290) 0.07
N2 (12) 1972-2000 No 1 (0.930)) -0.35 (0.260) 0.06
N3 (12) 1972-1995 No 1.03 (0.870) -0.33 (0.230) 0.05
N4 (15) 1972-2008 No 12 (0.930) -1.64 (0.260) 0.62
N5 (15) 1972-1995 No 11.82 (1.054) -1.76 (0.297) 0.56
N6 (15) 1972-2000 No 11.3 (1.126) -1.81 (0.312) 0.49
N7 (13) 1972-1995 Yes -0.29 (1.248) -0.08 (0.320) -0.58 (0.350) 4.6 0.18
N8 (13) 1972-2008 Yes 0.07 (1.034) -1.13 (0.265) -0.56 (0.294) 4.6 0.12
N9 (14) 1972-1995 Yes 10.8 (1.024) -1.36 (0.278) -0.65 (0.294) 4.6 0.69
N10 (14) 1972-2008 Yes 11.8 (1.024) -1.92 (0.343) 0.22 (0.280) 4.6 0.50
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Models with with PA gap included are productivity-augmented Phillips curves.
Initial A0 used (4.6) is the authors’ calculation.
Note that models 1-3 and 7-8 use ∆pi as the dependent variable, while models 4-6 and 9-10 use
the inflation rate pi as dependent variable.
EE is the equation estimated in the respective models.
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5 Conclusion
In this thesis, I have looked at the theoretical foundations for, and the actual historical
developments of, important macroeconomic variables. Especially have I looked at infla-
tion and unemployment, and the relationship between them. The standard approach to
inflation and unemployment dynamics (the simple Phillips curve) has been discussed and
compared to more general relationships. All theories discussed belong to the same class
of models – they are models where inflation typically moves in the opposite direction of
unemployment, due to the effects of lower unemployment on wage and price increases.
These effects are then propagated by the price-wage spiral.
I have examined the theoretical foundations of the Phillips curve, and examined
what the implications of altered assumptions in this model are. Special attention has
been given the neoclassical factor rewardance result for labor and wages. A breakdown
of this result is seen to alter the Phillips relation, because it affects the relation between
price growth and wage growth. If wage growth does not follow labor productivity growth,
firms will generally pass on less inflation to consumers, since they have relatively lower
unit labor costs. This can dampen the price-wage spiral, and possibly prevent it from
occuring at all. If one wishes to use such concepts as the NAIRU, one is advised to keep
these theoretical foundations in mind.
The productivity-augmented Phillips curve takes the breakdown of neoclassical foun-
dations explicitly into account, by allowing wage growth and labor productivity growth
to diverge in the short run. This can potentially change the inflation-unemployment
dynamics of an economy. I have examined the so-called “New Economy” in light of this,
and it seems that such changes have had a significant effect on the development of un-
employment and inflation. Of course, all of the events that occured in the latter part of
the 90s in the U.S. relied heavily on the high rate of labor productivity growth over this
period. My approach to modelling wage growth is based on aspirations for “fair wage
growth”, where workers take historical values of such aspirations and real wage growth
into account.
33
Estimating productivity-augmented Phillips curves for the U.S., the U.K. and Norway,
I find that the introduction of a gap variable representing divergence of aspirations for
wage growth and productivity growth generally increases the explanatory power of these
models. This variable does indeed help explain inflation variation in the U.S. when
looking at the years of the New Economy (1996-2000). For the U.K., large gains in
explanatory power follow the inclusion of this gap in the estimated models. For Norway,
the importance of this gap in the inflation process seems moderate. This gap variable
has, in almost all estimated models, the expected sign, and the effects of it are generally
found to be statistically significant.
The lesson is: we must become more critical of the assumptions we build our analyses
on – the fact that something is true for a certain period of time does not make it true in
general. We must also extend our knowledge of how psychological factors contribute to
decisions affecting pricing, hiring and production. Only then can we hope to solve the
puzzles of inflation and unemployment.
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• Inflation rate (BLS): annual percentage change in the consumer price index. All
urban consumers (CPI-U), U.S. city average, all items.
• Unemployment rate (BLS): unemployment rate (unadjusted), 16 years and over.
BLS series number: LNU04000000.
• Inflation (OECD): consumer price index, percentage change from previous period.
• Labour productivity growth (OECD): labour productivity annual growth rate.
• Nominal wage growth (OECD): labour compensation per unit labour input,
business sector excluding agriculture, annual growth rate.
• Unemployment rate (OECD): harmonised unemployment rate, all persons.
Table (1): BLS data.
Tables (2)-(7): OECD data.
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Table 7: Phillips curve estimates for the U.S. - all coefficients included
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
US1 3.03 (1.091) 0.332 (0.132) -0.46 (0.127) -0.50 (0.172) 0.51
US2 3.74 (1.381) 0.336 (0.148) -0.43 (0.144) -0.59 (0.208) 0.55
US3 4.05 (1.172) 0.280 (0.126) -0.38 (0,122) -0.53 (0.177) -0.73 (0.228) 0.69
US4 4.16 (1.085) 0.220 (0.119) -0.37 (0,113) -0.65 (0.163) -0.75 (0.190) 0.74
US5 3.31 (0.976) 0.277 (0.119) -0.42 (0.114) -0.44 (0.154) 0.51
US6 3.62 (0.935) 0.226 (0.115) -0.40 (0.108) -0.57 (0.146) -0.64 (0.174) 0.66
US4 and US6 with A0 = AVG, US3 with A0 = 0.49.
β1 is the coefficient on ∆pit−1 and β2 is the coefficient on ∆pit−2.
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4 Productivity growth (US) Aspirations (US) 
 
Top graph:  Inflation and unemployment rates for the U.S. 
Bottom graph:  (labor) productivity growth and aspirations for the U.S. 
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Productivity growth (UK) Aspirations (UK) 
 
Top graph:  Inflation and unemployment rates for the U.K. 
Bottom graph:  (labor) productivity growth and aspirations for the U.K. 
Source:  OECD Stat.Extracts (http://www.oecd.org) 
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Productivity growth (Norway) Aspirations (Norway) 
 
Top graph:  Inflation and unemployment rates for Norway 
Bottom graph:  (labor) productivity growth and aspirations for Norway 
Source:  OECD Stat.Extracts (http://www.oecd.org) 
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